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Although Christ settles the issue of when jeopardy will
attach in a jury trial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, it offers no standards for determining when a retrial will be barred after a mistrial. The rule established
early was that retrials would be barred unless there was a
manifest necessity for the mistrial. United States u.
Perez, 9 Wheat 579 (1924). Significant factors in determining whether there should be a retrial after mistrial are
(1) the source of difficulty (the prosecution or defendant), (2) the associated motivation (intentional harrassment), (3) the indicated prejudice to the defendant
associated with retrial and (4) the available alternatives
to mistrial. Schulhofer, Jeopardyand Mistrials 125 U.Pa.
L. Rev. 449 (1977).
Another case, Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 54
L.Ed. 2d 717, 98 S.Ct. (1978) decided February 21, 1978,
grappled with the issue of when there was manifest
necessity for a mistrial. Respondent in this case has been
granted a new trial because the prosecutor had withheld
exculpatory evidence. During opening argument of the
new trial, defense counsel made comments to the effect
that a new trial had been granted by the superior court
because of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor at
the second trial moved for a mistrial on the basis that
defense counsel's statements were inadmissable. In
granting the prosecutor's motion, the trial judge failed to
find that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial or
consider alternatives to a mistrial.
It is the conclusion of the Court that the record amply
demonstrates the need to terminate the trial because of
possible prejudice of the jurors. The trial judge was present during the trial and the decision to declare a mistrial,
because of prejudice, was a matter entirely within his discretion. Hence the Court concludes that:
The trial judge's mistrial declaration is not subject to
collateral attack simply because he failed to find
"manifest necessity" in those words or to articulate on
the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion. Arizona u. Washington,
supra at 517.
Although four doctrines were mentioned at the beginning of the article, only those confronted by the Supreme
Court this term were discussed. These cases only deal
with the first two doctrines. As in the case of the rule that
jeopardy attaches after the first juror is sworn, the other
doctrines were engrafted into the constitutional doctrine
against being placed twice in jeopardy without a great
deal of discussion as to the rationale for doing so.
Judge Charles E. Moylon would say that when one
thinks about the law of double jeopardy, that person
should think plural. There is no single law of double jeopardy, but many.

An Analysis of the
Baltimore City Police
Complaint Evaluation
Procedures
by Stephen R. Cochell
John Alan Jones
Introduction
Society entrusts the police officer with an awesome
responsibility; literally the power of life and death.
Because society grants this authority to the police
officer, it is also society's responsibility to review the
actions of the police, particularly when it comes to the
use of their ultimate weapon, the gun.
WJZ-TV 13 (Baltimore, Maryland)
Editorial Aired June 20, 1978.
Review of police misconduct by the community has
traditionally generated friction and conflict among advocates of so-called "civilian review boards" and the police
community. A number of civilian review boards have
been established in several cities across the country.
Their history of failure is mostly attributed to what has
been termed the "dilemma' of civilian review of police
misconduct. Simply stated, the pro-civilian review
groups believe that police are not responsive to the realities of their everyday lives while, on the other hand,
police are unwilling to open the processes by which their
actions are examined and potentially evaluated to those
outside the police department.
A 1969 study of police attitudes towards civilian review
revealed that two-thirds of the officers surveyed believed
that the public had a right to "pass judgment on the way
the police are doing their job." Sixty percent of the officers, however, were opposed to the mere idea of a
civilian review board even if the members were "fair and
unbiased."
While citizens wish to protect their civil liberties
against potential abuse of police authority, they also view
the police as a symbol of safety and security.
This "love-hate" relationship fosters disputes between
citizens and police which are difficult to resolve. During
the civil disorders of the late 1%0's, attention was
focused on the allegations of police brutality and other
forms of alleged police misconduct. In the wake of the
actions by the Chicago Police during the 1%8 Democratic National Convention (termed a "police riot"), a
number of cities began to search for a method to investigate allegations of police misconduct. See National Advi.
sory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission Report).
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Three procedural systems for evaluating complaints of
police misconduct have evolved as a result of the initial
efforts of the Kerner Commission. These include: systems internally administered by police; systems administered by civilians; and systems which share authority
between the police and the community. This section of
the report will evaluate the first two systems while the
third alternative will be discussed in greater detail in the
remainder of this study.
Typically, where review systems are internally administered by the police, there have been ongoing complaints of cover-ups. Brent, Redress of Alleged Police
Misconduct: A New Approach to Citizen Complaints
and Police Disciplinary Procedures, 11 U.San Fran. L.
Rev. 587 (1977). Generally, the internal system consists
of an internal investigation conducted by the police
themselves with some type of variety of administrative
review of the allegations. Critics of this type of review
system argue that it is not practical to expect police to be
able to investigate themselves. The reasoning is that it is
not a matter of dishonesty or even cover-up. It is an issue
of attitude on the part of the investigators. As one critic
of this system of evaluating police misconduct put it,
"They go into the investigation expecting the complaint
to be unfounded." The issue of whether such criticisms
are valid is immaterial. A more important objection to
this type of system is that an internal investigation by the
same department (regardless of its quality and completeness) is perceived by the community as a "cover-up" or
"whitewash." The integrity of the police department is
not only brought into question by the initial allegations of
misconduct but by the procedures with which those allegations are evaluated. The result is that the community
views the process with suspicion and distrust.
There are three major cities which have instituted a
completely civilian review of police misconduct complaints. These include Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, New York and a newly instituted program in
San Francisco, California. Of those, the Philadelphia
program was eliminated by actions of Mayor Rizzo. See
Rizzo u.Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Civilian Review boards have encountered resistance
and hostility to their establishment. Objections range
from the reasonable to the absurd. As -one retired
police lieutenant put it, "The policeman naturally desires that his alleged delinquencies and violations of rules
be reviewed and judged by those who have "been
through the mill' themselves." The possibility that his
very human errors or even outright exercise of poor
judgment would be reviewed and judged by men biased
by political or racial motivation, and that the judgment
could jeopardize his entire career, served to congeal
rank and file opposition. Another, less thoughtful but
nonetheless widely circulated belief was stated by Robert

W. Welch, Jr., founder and president of the John Birch
Society. He stated that the drive for civilian review
boards is part of "a subtle, but now increasingly bolder
and more extensive effort to harass and discredit local
police forces and their individual officials and members
going on in our country for more than a decade."
The Complaint Evaluation Board (CEB) was created
to provide an agency to review and evaluate complaints
lodged by members of the general public regarding
alleged acts of discourtesy and excessive force by personnel of the Baltimore City Police Department. Baltimore City Local Laws, §16-41. The CEB is composed of
seven members including the following agencies:
(1) State's Attorney of Baltimore City
(2) Attorney General of Maryland
(3) City Solicitor of Baltimore City (chairperson)
(4) Police Commissioner of Baltimore City
(5) Executive Director, Legal Aid, Inc., Baltimore City
(6) Executive Director, Maryland Human Relations
Commission
(7) Executive Director, Baltimore City Community Relations Commission
The CEB is required to meet at least once a month and
must have five members present to constitute a quorum.
The statute provided a complaint procedure for "any
person who claims to have been subjected to, or any person who claims to have personal knowledge of an act or
acts of discourtesy, use of excessive force, or injury allegedly resulting from excessive force by Police personnel." Baltimore City LocalLaws §16-42(a). Upon making
a written and notorized complaint, the Internal Investigation Division (liD) and the Secretary of the Board (Legal
Aid) are mailed copies within 48 hours. The Secretary
starts a case file and lID initiates its investigation. The
investigation is completed within 90 days and the report
and lID recommendations are then forwarded to the
CEB. The CEB conducts its review of the lID report and,
within 30 days of receipt of the lID report, communicates
its findings and recommendations to the Commissioner.
Id., §16-42(f). The Commissioner then makes his disposition within 30 days of receipt of the CEB report.
The statute provides that upon review of the investigative record of each case, the CEB may recommend the
following alternatives to the Commissioner:
(1) Sustain the complaint and approve, modify or disapprove the proposed LID action;
(2) Dismiss the complaint because of lack or insufficiency of evidence;
(3) Exonerate police personnel because of complainant's failure to prove his case by clear and convincing
evidence;
(4) Remand the case for further investigation by lID or
refer the case for further investigation by the Maryland State Police.,

IX/2

Additionally, the Board may request that the involved
complainant, witnesses or police personnel voluntarily
submit a polygraph test or appear before the Board.
Significantly, the statute provides that police personnel may not be adversely affected or penalized in any way
as a result of CEB proceedings without having been first
afforded proper notice and an opportunity to present his
case to a hearing board within the police department.
Baltimore City Local Laws §16-47.
Operations of the Complaint Evaluation Board
Since its inception, the CEB has processed from 200 to
270 complaints of excessive force and discourtesy in
each fiscal reporting year. A recent of CRC report indicates a number of statistical trends worthy of note. In
comparing the period of January-June, 1977 and
January-June, 1978, the report found that the number of
cases declined by 21%, the number of persons filing by
18% and the number of accused police officers by 28%.
Moreover, it was determined that the number of discourtesy charges decreased by 21% while excessive force
charges declined by 33%. The reporter, however, noted
significant limitations to his findings. First, the complaints filed during that time period may not have been
reviewed by the CEB until the next time period. In other
words, there was no record of open cases carried over
from period to period. The report stated that the
decrease could be attributable to an actual decline in the
number of cases, persons filing or with the method of
data collection.
A CRC Staff Report evaluated the performance of the
CEB as mandated by the Legislature. The report concluded from its statistical analysis that the CEB was not
carrying out the intent and spirit of the statutory directive (See Appendix). This was based on a finding that
procedures had not been established or filing formal
complaints at Police District Stations. Moreover,
the report alleged that the CEB was in violation of its
directive to submit in writing to the Police Commissioner, a statement of its findings of fact with recommendations. It was also alleged that procedures for voluntary
appearances of complainants, witnesses and police had
not been promulgated. The report also made several
recommendations for legislative revision of procedures
to evaluate complaints of police misconduct. (See
Appendix B).
The performance of the CEB is not the primary focus
of this study nor is the frequency or infrequency of
"police brutality" relevant to an overview of the problem.
Rather, this report focuses on the procedural deficiencies of the CEB and the subsequent rifts such defects
produce in the police-community relationship.
The Law Enforcement Bill of Rights
Article 27, §727 to 734A delineates the rights of police
officers and the procedures to be followed by the various

law enforcement agencies when disciplinary hearings are
instituted against police for misconduct. The statute defines "law enforcement officer" as any person, in his official capacity, who is authorized to make arrests and is a
member of one of the specified agencies. Art. 27,
§727(b). The statute excludes probationary officers
except when there are allegations of brutality within the
scope of their duties as police officers. Accused of miscondfict, the allegation is heard by a hearing board
appointed by the police commissioner. The board's composition included three members of the agency who have
had no part in the investigation or interrogation of the law
enforcement officer against whom the complaint has
been filed.
Complaints against police officers alleging police brutality in the execution of duties cannot be investigated
unless the complaint is made under oath by the complainant, his/her immediate family or any interested person who possesses first-hand knowledge of the incident.
Art. 27, §728 (b)(4) (1978 Supp). As this type of complaint
could lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal,
the procedures for investigation or interrogation are provided by statute. Basically, the statute directs that officers be informed in writing of the investigation prior to
interrogation, that names of the witnesses and the identity and rank of the investigating officer be disclosed. The
statute also sets forth guidelines as to how and when the
interrogation should be conducted. Art. 27, §728(b). The
law enforcement officer can be ordered to take blood alcohol tests, blood, breath or urine tests for controlled
dangerous substances, polygraph examinations or interrogations specifically related to the subject matter of the
investigation. Art 27, §728(b)(7)(ii). Refusal to submit to
such tests constitutes grounds for punitive action. It is
significant, however, that evidence acquired by tests
obtained under orders is inadmissible in any subsequent administrative or criminal proceeding unless the
officer gives consent to such admission. Id. Officers
under interrogation have the right to counsel at all times
during interrogation.

Ihoto by J.J.K.
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If the investigation or interrogation of the officer results in recommendations for some type of punitive measure (e.g. demotion, dismissal, etc.) the officer is entitled
to notice and a hearing on the issue involved. Art. 27,
§ 730(a). At that time, a hearing board is convened to consider the matter. Both the agency and the officer possess
the right to counsel, to present and cross-examine witnesses, and give argument on the facts adduced. The
hearing board is not bound by technical rules of evidence
but shall give probative effect to "evidence which
possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs."
Art. 27, §730(a).
The decisions, orders or actions of the hearing board
are then written and submitted to the officer. If found
guilty of a charge/complaint, the board conducts a hearing as to past performance and other factors relevant to
formulating a recommendation to the Commissioner.
Art. 27, §731(a). The Commissioner is not bound by the
Board's recommendation and is bound to take action
within 30 days of receipt of the board action. Action by
the Commissioner is deemed a "final order" (Art. 27,
§731c) which may be appealed to the Baltimore City
Court. Art. 27. §732. See Md. Rule B2. Article 27, §734c
provides that any person who knowingly makes a false
report, statement of complaint, is subject to a $500 fine
and/or not more than 6 months imprisonment. See Art.
27, § 150.
Foreseeing potential conflict with other state statutes,
the legislature established the superiority of the Law Enforcement Bill of Rights in §734 B:
The provisions of this subtitle (Law Enforcement
Bill of Rights) shall supercede any State, County or
municipal law, ordinance or regulation that conflicts
with the provisions of this subtitle, and local legislation
shall be preempted by the subject and material of this
subtitle.
See Prince George's County, Maryland et.al. v. State of
Maryland Commission on Human Relations, C.S.A.,
#264, S.T. 1978, filed October 16, 1978.
A plain reading of the statute indicates that any alteration or restructuring of the police complaint and disciplinary system must fall within and/or satisfy the strictures
of the Law Enforcement Bill of Rights or, in the alternative, the Bill of Rights must be revised to conform with
the new procedures.
Findings and Recommendations
FINDING
Upon our discussions with citizens, police, CEB members, complainants, alleging police misconduct and
attendance at a variety of meetings and hearings concerning alleged misconduct of police, we conclude that
the present procedures for internal investigation of complaints of excessive force/discourtesy are viewed with
distrust by citizens.

Citizens interviewed typically complained that the
police should not be investigating themselves and suspected they protected their brother officers. Several
CEB members and police, on the other hand, disclaim
such allegations and claim that internal investigations
(liD) did not interview all the witnesses to the incident.
In our opinion, internal investigation by lID may be
conducted with completeness and thoroughness. It is
the appearance of impropriety, however, that inflames
critics of the police and brings the department into
disrepute.
RECOMMENDATION
Complaints of excessive force should be investigated
and evaluated by an independent investigative unit. The
most appropriate agency equipped to perform such
functions would be the Maryland State Police. It is believed that the State Police possess the necessary independence and acceptance by the community to conduct
investigations of excessive force.
FINDING
Discussions with police and CEB members disclosed
that many of the complaints (particularly discourtesy
and some excessive force complaints) were considered
to be minor in nature and could be processed in a more
timely manner. Citizen-complainants were typically
angry at the length of time it took to process the complaints and were dissatisfied with their exclusion from the
process.
Testimony of citizens at the CRC hearings disclosed
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that many citizens were not aware that a CEB existed.
Others were not aware of where and how a complaint
could be filed.
RECOMMENDATION
1. An informal settlement procedure should be established which would receive complaints and attempt to
mediate such complaints within 30 days of filing.
A full-time salaried employee appointed by the Mayor
and approved by the City Council should perform this
function. It is further suggested that this individual possess training in arbitration/mediation techniques and/or
a law degree.
2. The complaint system should be more accessible to
citizens. Complaint sites should be located in district
police stations, the CRC, Human Relations Commission, City State's Attorney, City Solicitor, the Mayor's
Office and the offices of any City Council member or any
other agency that could legitimately shoulder such
responsibility.
FINDING
The present CEB is composed of agencies which serve
a "watchdog" function. The CEB evaluates the LID findings and recommendations by reading synopses of "field
interviews" with witnesses and complainants of alleged
police misconduct. One underlying assumption is that
the legal skills and knowledge of the majority of the CEB
members will assure a thorough and sufficient investigation by LID. This assumption, however, is fraught with
difficulty.
Initially, one must admit that interrogation or questioning of witnesses is a subjective process. Admittedly, the
officer's task is to record each individual's version of the
facts but it is also true that the facts elicited depend upon
the questions asked and the importance assigned those
facts by the investigator. In other words, the sufficiency
of the investigation depends upon the motivations and
integrity of the investigator. The CEB members must
rely on those reports in evaluating credibility and demeanor of the witnesses - a process essential to the task of
fact-finding. Under the present system, inconsistency of
stories and a "feel" for the situation is restricted to what
may be gleaned from the written report.
Significantly, the CEB process, as constituted, does
not provide for the complainant to review and either
agree or disagree with the findings of the lID investigation
procedure before, during or after the case has been processed. The citizen-complainant is completely excluded
from the process until he is notified by the Commissioner
of the disposition of his case. It is no surprise that citizens
would be angry, frustrated and suspicious of this type of
procedure.
RECOMMENDATION
Citizen -complainants should be included at some
point in the process by which their complaints are evaluated. At the very least, complainants should have the
opportunity to give written rebuttal to the LID report or

elect to appear for a limited period of time before the
body which evaluates the sufficiency of their complaint.
It is further recommended that the model for evaluating complaints of police misconduct be shifted from one
of outside agencies reviewing written police reports to an
adversarial style proceeding.
Inclusion of citizen-complainants in the process of evaluating complaints would achieve three objectives that
are not currently performed by the existing system:
(1) The citizen-complainants would believe that
someone is doing something" about their complaints;
(2) Their side of the story would be fully and completely told; and
(3) Complainants might hear the officer's perspective
and come to understand the basis of his conduct.
A Proposed Model for Evaluating Complaints
of Police Misconduct
In light of our findings concerning the present system
of evaluating complaints of police misconduct, we suggest that the Maryland Legislature revise the affected
statutes from an agency-review model of complaint evaluation to an adversarial-style proceeding conducted as
an administrative hearing. The alternative that we
recommend should not be considered the sole solution
to the deficiencies of the present system. The proposed
model, instead, should serve as a catalyst for future
action.
One underlying principle in approaching revision of
the present system was to insure the rights of police officers under the existing Law Enforcement Bill of Rights,
yet open up those adjudicatory processes to complainants and the communities the police exist to serve. We
believe the following proposal recognizes and implements this principle.
To accomplish the following, it will be necessary to
abolish the CEB and revise the composition of Police
Hearing Boards in administrative hearings regarding excessive force only. The composition of the Hearing
Board would be the following; a police hearing officer,
two police officers and two citizens.
1. Appointment of a Police Hearing Officer: This individual would be appointed by the Mayor and approved
by the City Council. The Hearing Officer should possess
a law degree and/or membership in the American Arbitration Association. This individual would serve as chairperson at administrative hearings concerning allegations
of excessive force and discourtesy. As to allegations of
disrespect, it is recommended that attempts at informal
settlement with citizen-complainants be made by the
hearing officer utilizing skills and techniques of mediation
and arbitration. Considerable latitude should be granted
the hearing officer in requiring the participation of a
police officer in the mediation process. If an informal settlement can be achieved with the complainant, then a
"police trial board" has been avoided to the benefit of the
officer, complainant and the community. Failure to reach
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settlement would result in the complaint being handled
by a traditional police board procedure. All statements
or evidence adduced at the informal settlement should
not be used against the officer.
One benefit offered by this form of mediation is that it
can be handled more quickly and efficiently. Citizencomplainants will "feel" better about the police if their
claims are handled rapidly, while it is fresh in their minds,
and are mediated by an official independent of the police.
Moreover, participation by police officers in a problemsolving atmosphere will illustrate to citizen-complainants
the difficulties of the role of the police and the very
human errors which all individuals can make. This is the
sine qua non of police-community relations.
2. Members from the Police Department: Two officers should be appointed by the Commissioner to serve
on the hearing board. One officer should be of the same
rank as the officer against whom the complaint has been
lodged. The second officer should be of an administrative
rank.

3. Citizen Members: It is recommended that two citizens serve on the police trial board on charges of excessive force and discourtesy. Ideally, these citizens would
be randomly selected from a list of volunteers compiled
by the hearing officer subject to minimal screening requirements. Additionally, volunteers could be subject to
approval by the Mayor and/or City Council. An appropriate term of service would be 1-2 years.
In our opinion, citizen members on the trial board
would educate community leaders as to the role and
functions of police in the community. Inclusion of citizens on police trial boards would also dispel claims of
impropriety by the police department in processing and
evaluating police misconduct. Additionally, the board
would be balanced so that citizens and police would have
equal representation. It is believed that the hearing
officer would quickly become familiar with the functioning of the police department and would have the ability to
identify with the department when appropriate.
The conduct of the proceedings should not be altered.
The same due process rights should be afforded officers
accused of misconduct; that is, notice, right to counsel
and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses
should be retained. Police should have the right to refuse
blood and polygraph tests and if ordered to take such
tests, evidence should be inadmissible in subsequent proceedings unless the officer consents to admission. The same procedures as to disposition of officers
found guilty should be followed in that the Board would
conduct a hearing as to past performance and other relevant factors and make a recommendation to the Commissioner. The Commissioner would not be bound by
this recommendation and would be required to take
action within 30 days of receipt of the board action. A dis-

position contrary to the trial board, however, should
contain in particular the Commissioner's objections and
concerns about the trial board findings or recommendations. Action at the Commissioner's level would be considered a "final order" appealable to the Baltimore City
Court.
CONCLUSION
The recommendations are geared to alleviate existing
deficiencies in the present system for evaluating complaints of police misconduct. The objectives were to
devise a system which would provide greater access into
the system for complainants and provide for accountability between the parties; that is, the officer and complainant should have an opportunity to resolve their
differences directly and informally within a brief period of
time (for minor offenses). Accountability would be built
into the formal system as citizens would sit on the trial
board and would have an opportunity to participate in
the decision-making process. The procedural due process rights of police officers would be preserved as none
of the rights established by the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights would be eliminated. As before, all
recommendations by the trial board would be subject to
rejection by the Commissioner.
Appendix A
Findings of CRC Report - 6/12/78
Viewed from the perspective of the CRC as a statutory
member on the CEB, these statistics reflect the lack of
full implementation, both in spirit and intent, of key elements of the legislation which created the CEB. Those
portions are:
Section 16-42(a), That Police District Stations be included among the locations at which formal complaints
may be received and filed.
Section 16-42(c), That a copy of each complaint be
mailed within 8 hours to the lID and to the Secretary of
CEB.
Section 16-42(d), That the Secretary of the Board mail
within 48 hours a copy of the filed complaint to each
member of the Board.
Section 16-42(f), The CEB is to submit in writing to the
Police Commissioner a statement of its Findingswith its
Recommendations. The Police Commissioner in turn,
within 30 days of his receipt of the Board's findings and
recommendations, is to forward to the Board a statement of his disposition of each case, concurrent with his
notifying the complaining citizen and the respondent
police personnel of his and the Board's disposition (findings and recommendations).
Section 16-43(c), That the Board may request the complainant, witnesses, and the police personnel involved in
a particular complaint to appear voluntarily before the
Board.
Section 16-45, That nothing contained in this article may
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abrogate any constitutional, statutory, or common law
right of the complainants or witnesses who participate in
the complaint procedure. (i.e. reopening criminal
charges previously settled.)
Secton 16-50, That the Board shall prepare and publish a
semi-annual statistical and analytical report regarding
the complaints processed under this Article.

Authority of The House
of Representatives
to Expell a Member
by Thomas J. Sehler*
I. INTRODUCTION

Appendix B - Recommendations of CRC Report 6/12/78
In light of the refusal of the majority of the Board's
members to comply fully with all portions of Article 16,
Section 41-50, CRC staff has prepared the following
recommendations addressing citizen complaints of
police abuse:
1. Independent body be established and empowered to
receive and investigate citizen allegations of police
abuse. This investigative body shall have the legal access
to all pertinent records, citizen and police personnel
necessary to pursue and process citizen complaints.
Establishment of such a body would remove the investigation of police abuse from its present vulnerability to in
fluence and favoritism by members of one police division
(i.e. IID) investigating police abuse of citizens by
members of other police divisions. For example, the detective assigned to investigate allegations of police abuse
by a citizen may tend to slant his investigation in favor of
the accused police officer, in situations where that detective is under peer group pressure to advocate on behalf
of the accused officers.
2. A civilian component of the CEB be instituted to sit at
each meeting of the CEB, provide input and comment on
each police complaint case as it comes before the CEB,
their comments be incorporated into the Findings and
Recommendations of the CEB.
3. Each statutory member of the CEB should prepare a
written analysis and recommendations on police abuse
cases, prior to every meeting of the CEB. Through the
process of deliberation, the CEB should arrive at a
recommendation on each case, based upon Findings
adopted by the majority of the Board, as well as the Findings and Recommendations of each statutory member of
the Board who may be in dissent from the majority.
4. There should be clearly defined procedures and
guidelines by which the CEB could hold Hearings on citizen allegations of police abuse. These Hearings would
provide citizens with an alternative to the present system
of investigation by LID. The CEB would then present
Findings and Recommendations to the Police Commissioner based upon Evidence presented at the CEB
Hearings.
5. The Findings and Recommendations of the CEB
should be binding upon the Police Commissioner, unless
the respondent police personnel elects to appeal the decision of the CEB before a Police Trial Board.

This report summarizes the historical and legal precedents respecting the power of the House of Representatives to expel one of its Members. There exists no constitutional provision, federal statute, House rule, or
precedent which is totally dispositive of the issue. Instances in which the House has expelled Members
number three, all occuring in the 37th Congress.
I!. AUTHORITY
Each respective House of the Congress is given the
power to expel its Members in Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 of the
U.S. Constitution:
Each House-may determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
Member.
In a Library of Congress Multilith entitled "Precedents of
the House of Representatives in Respect to Procedure
for Censure or Expulsion", prepared by Robert L.
Tienken (Dec. 29, 1966), there appears the following
discussion:
There is no judicial process for unseating a Member; it is not a function of the Executive; and, it cannot
be achieved through State recall statutes (see Burton
v. U.S., 202 U.S. 344 (1906); In Re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661 (1897)). Even where a statute prescribes that conviction for an offense shall bar a person from federal
office, there is no automatic expulsion of a Member.
As the Supreme Court stated in Burton v. U.S.,
supra, P. 369: ". . the final judgment of conviction
[does] not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat of [a]
convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel
him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the
judgment." The decision must be made by the House
involved.
It follows, then, that the House has exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of expulsion of its Members.
The grounds for expulsion are extremely far-reaching.
While the House has been guarded in the use of its power
to expel, Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, vol. VI, sec. 78, reveals that "The power of the
House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a matter
purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote,
from which there is no appeal." Included in this precedent, which relates to the South Carolina election case
against Richard S. Whaley in the 63rd Congress, is lan-

